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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
LATERAL SUPPORT IN WISCONSIN
Recently the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the case of Schmidt v.
Chapman' re-examined the law of lateral support in Wisconsin. The
ensuing article will attempt to survey that law in light of its historical
development and with a critical view to more recent case law. Con-
sideration will be given to some of the practical problems which must
be faced in this area and to the more important policy decisions which
underlie them. Finally, an examination of the various methods for de-
termining damages in lateral support cases and a discussion of the lia-
bility attaching to an independent contractor will be undertaken.
Common Law Theories
"The right of lateral support is the right which soil in its natural
state has to support from land adjoining it.1'2 The principle that the
owner of land has the right to lateral support from the adjoining soil
as a settled doctrine of common law was based on the theory that the
right to lateral support was a natural one arising ex jure naturae and
was an incident to the ownership of land. The right was, therefore,
an absolute right which necessarily and naturally attached to the soil
and passed with it.3 It is questionable whether this principle is presently
reflected in the policy of modern case law. 4
According to the Restatement of Torts,5 two conflicting legal theories
as to the nature of the right to support have contributed to the present
law. The earliest theory regards the right as a natural easement ap-
purtenant to the supported land and subjecting the supporting land to
a natural easement. As thus regarded the right is a right in the support-
ing land which becomes the servient estate, while the supported land
is the dominant estate. An unqualified adoption of this theory would
result in the following:
(1) [T]he right would exist only as to the supported land itself
and would not apply to support needed because of artificial
structures on or any other alterations in the surrounding land;
(2) the right would probably be violated by the mere removal
of support; neither intention to cause harm nor negligence would
be necessary to liability;
(3) the right would probably be violated when the support is
withdrawn; subsidence or other actual harm would not be neces-
sary to liability;
(4) prospective damages could be recovered once the right is
violated;
126 Wis. 2d 11, 131 N.W. 2d 689 (1964).
2 1 Ai. JUR. (SECOND) Adjoining Landowners §37 (1962).
3Ibid.
4 As discussed later in the article, the right to lateral support at present is
probably more accurately said to be based on negligence law rather than a
theory of natural right.
5 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §817 (1939).
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(5) the statute of limitations would begin to run once the support
is removed.6
The other and later theory regarded the right as a right to the integrity
of the supported land, a right invaded only by actual subsidence being
caused by the removal of support. Results of this theory would be:
(1) [T]he right would exist in respect to the land in its natural
or altered condition and to the artificial additions on it;
(2) the right would not be violated by mere removal of support;
intention to cause harm or negligence would be necessary to
liability;
(3) the right would not be violated when the support is with-
drawn; subsidence or other actual harm would not be necessary
to liability;
(4) prospective damages could not be recovered;
(5) the statute of limitations would not begin to run when the
support is removed; it would not begin to run until subsidence
or other actual harm happened.?
As the Restatement points out, neither of these views has unqualifiedly
prevailed, with the result that the consequences of parts of both theories
are intermingled in the present law.8
Distinction Between Improved and Unimproved Property
During the early 1600's the English courts first enunciated the
doctrine that an adjoining landowner was under no obligation to sup-
port the added burden of a structure on the neighboring property
though by his excavation such structure might be damaged. The general
rule that the right of the owner of land in its natural state to the lateral
support of the soil of the adjoining owner did not extend to buildings
on his land was pronounced in Wilde v. Ministerly.9 Palmer v. Fleshees0
stated that the theory was based on the right of each owner to make
the best advantage of his digging. Thus the English courts assumed
that a determination could be made as to what quantum of support
was required to hold up the land in its natural state and that the re-
moval of this quantum of support would impose liability.
Conceivably, though not expressed as such, the courts which first
made the distinction between improved and unimproved property were
concerned with the practical necessities of the times when property was
the measure of a man's wealth. It is not likely that the problem became
acute until the development of urban areas since buildings commonly
were not erected near boundary lines.
This continuing distinction between improved and unimproved prop-
erty has been said to be made on the basis that the owner of a building
6d. at 185.
7 Id. at 186.8 The application of these theories is discussed later.
9 2 Rolle Abr. 564 (1639).
10 Sid. 167, 82 Eng. Rep. 1035 (1663).
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ought to foresee the probable use of the adjoining land by his neighbor
and that if he builds near his boundary line he assumes the risk of
his position. A contrary rule "would put it in the power of the lot
owner, by erecting heavy buildings on his lot, to greatly abridge the
right of his neighbor to use his lot. It would make the rights of the
prior occupant greatly superior to those of the latter."" But it is diffi-
cult to see how the owner of an office building constructed more than
fifty years ago could foresee that the state would choose to build a
freeway many feet below the natural level of the adjoining land. The
present cost of protecting the building can be tremendous and may
even exceed the cost of erection.
Wisconsin first adopted the common law rule in the 1899 case of
Laycock v. Parker12 where, in an action by contractors against the
owners of a lot on which they built pursuant to contract, the court held
that lateral support from a neighbor's soil, as a right, applies only to
soil in its natural condition not burdened with buildings.
However, some twenty years later the court was presented with a
claim that the excavator went beyond his duty to support. In Hickman
v. Welleauer13 the court found that defendant, who had undertaken with
the contractor to underpin and support plaintiff's building, had an obli-
gation to use reasonable and proper methods with reasonable skill and
care. Judicial notice was taken of the methods usually employed by
excavators in providing support. Defendant's breach of duty with re-
spect to the method of underpinning resulted in his liability for plain-
tiff's consequential damages when the building listed. The holding of
the court was thus based on negligence rather than upon the natural
right of plaintiff to lateral support. The court specifically rejected
plaintiff's theory that the duty to support his building was shifted to
defendant as a result of the city building code. They held that only an
express declaration of the legislature could alter the property rights
here involved; that is, only a statutory declaration could alter the judge-
made rule. Thus the excavator, who may not have breached his common
law duty in terms of quantum of support he had removed, neverthe-
less became liable for negligence when, in exceeding his duty by under-
pinning, he did so in a negligent manner.
Thus in Christensen v. Mann,14 which followed Hickman, the court
again looked at the manner of underpining, finding it here to be the
proper measure for the protection of the building. It was held that the
"degree of care which must be exercised must be commensurate with
apparent or actual damage."'15 Here the contractor who did the excavat-
1" Northern Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1879).
12 103 Wis. 161, 79 N.W. 349 (1899).
13 169 Wis. 18, 171 N.W. 635 (1919).
14 187 Wis. 567, 204 N.W. 499 (1925).
15 Id. at 576, 204 N.W. at 502.
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ing sued the building owner for the cost of support and the defendant
answered that the cost should be borne by the excavator. The court
concluded that defendant-owner Mann could not appropriate to himself
the right of lateral support to his building. After the owners had given
proper notice and they and their contractors had exercised reasonable
care, they had performed their full duty, which would have immunized
them from any claim for consequential damages resulting to the Mann
property.
When thus analyzed, Christensen is only a case discussing the rea-
sonableness of the method of underpinning where the excavator under-
takes to support the added weight of his neighbor's building. But after
reaffirming the common law distinction, the court goes on to note that in
excavating ordinary care must be used:
So that the general proposition may be laid down that the degree
of care required in each particular case depends largely upon the
particular facts and circumstances and the physical conditions
existing in each case. When, however, the requirements applic-
able to a particular case have been properly met by the exca-
vator, then he is immune from a claim for damages by the
owner of an adjoining building, who under such circumstances
is required to afford and maintain proper protection for his own
building."0
Thus the court seems to add to the common law idea a requirement that
despite the fact that his excavation process would not of itself violate
his common law duty to supply a quantum of support to keep the land
in its natural state, he must exercise ordinary care as well.
Clearly then, the presence of a building on the adjoining premises
does not in and of itself relieve the excavator of the duty of support.
The cause of action in Wahl v. Kelly1 alleged that defendants removed
the lateral support and the land of plaintiff caved in and exposed his
basement to the elements. The court refused to sustain the demurrer
because there was nothing in the complaint from which it could be in-
ferred that the cave-in was due to the added weight of plaintiff's build-
ing.
These cases were cited by the court in Schmidt v. Chapman8s where-
in it was stated:
The landowner whose property is threatened by the planned
excavation owes a duty to protect the buildings that have been
constructed on his own land by taking reasonable measures to
protect his own land and buildings as against the intended exca-
vation and as against the collapse of his land and improvements
due to the excavating on the adjoining property.'9
16 Id. at 577, 204 N.W. at 502.
'7 194 Wis. 559, 217 N.W. 307 (1928).
'8 26 Wis. 2d 11, 131 N.W. 2d 689 (1964).
19 Id. at 22, 131 N.W. 2d at 695.
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In this case there was a strip of property upon which the excavator
trespassed in causing removal of support to plaintiff's building.20 The
court held that, irrespective of the trespass, the failure of the plaintiffs
Schmidts to use available means to protect the building "was, as a
matter of law, a substantial factor in causing the collapse of the wall."21
The contractor was also held to be causally negligent pursuant to jury
finding.
The real distinction made by the courts seems to be based upon a
determination of who should bear the burden-the excavating owner
while he is improving his property or the adjoining owner after he has
improved his property. The burden almost universally falls on the latter.
However, where negligence on the part of the excavator can be found
through his failure to give notice, improper excavation, or negligent
assumption of underpinning, then the burden shifts.
As in the Schmidt case, where both parties are found to be causally
negligent, the question arises as to whether the court is following the
natural right theory. Under such a theory the excavator has an absolute
duty to provide a quantum of support to the adjoining land in its nat-
ural state. Failure to do so makes him liable to the owner for the conse-
quential damages resulting from his breach of duty. But the obligation
of the adjoining owner to support his building is also in a sense an ab-
solute duty. Thus, as stated by Justice Currie in his concurring opin-
ion, 2 2 the liability seems to depend not on the breach of absolute duty,
but rather on comparative negligence.
Practically the courts must still decide how the weight of a building
affects the quantum of support which must be displaced before the
natural support is removed. This will be especially difficult in downtown
metropolitan areas where there is little soil as such remaining and the
topography may bear little relationship to what it was naturally.
Statutory Liability
Some states, which do not by statute, ordinance, or case law require
that notice of intent to excavate be given, have provided other statutory
liabilities on the excavator for the protection of the adjoining land
owner. These statutes fall into three general categories, the first being
statutes which impose absolute liability. The effect of these statutes was
that where the depth of the excavation exceeded statutory limits, the
excavator was, independently of negligence, liable for an injury caused
by the excavation to an adjoining building3 The second type of sta-
tute or ordinance imposed upon persons excavating to a certain depth
20The legal problem here is discussed under the non-coterminous tract heading.
21 26 Wis. 2d at 23, 131 N.W. 2d at 696.
22 Id. at 27, 131 N.W. 2d at 698.
23 Foss-Schneider Brewing Co. v. Ulland, 97 Ohio St. 210, 119 N.E. 454 (1918).
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an absolute duty to protect the adjoining building.2 4 By the third type
of statute which required protection of adjoining land, the liability of
the excavator was made to depend on whether or not he exercised
proper care. The statute requiring support of land was construed to
exclude buildings, due to the statutory definition of land.25
Notice of Intent to Excavate Requirements
Another indication of the role of negligence as at least one standard
to be applied to lateral support lies in the duty to give notice.
The obligation to give notice.., seems to rest upon the recog-
nized proposition that a party in possession of fixed property
must take care that it is so used and managed that other persons
shall not be injured, whether it is managed by his own servants
or contractors or their servants.2 6
In requiring that notice of intent to excavate be given to the adjoin-
ing landowner, the courts have adopted the theory that the trouble
caused the excavator is little compared to that of the adjoining owner
who, without notice, may not have sufficient time to protect his property
adequately. It has been held that giving notice is more than mere neigh-
borly courtesy because it involves the right of one man to assert his right
regardless of the injury he may cause to his neighbor without such
warning.
The duty to notify the adjoining owner of the proposed excavation
has been affirmed in nine states, including Wisconsin,2 in addition to
the requirement being included in dicta in other jurisdictions." In Hick-
man v. Welleauer ° the Wisconsin court said:
In the absence of actual knowledge by the plaintiff of the de-
fendant's intended excavation so near plaintiff's building that
damage thereto might be anticipated, it was incumbent upon de-
fendant to give reasonable notice of such intention that plaintiff
might have an opportunity to protect and support his building."'
24 Hirschberg v. Flusser, 91 N.J.L. 66, 102 Atl. 353 (1917), aff'd, 92 N.J.L. 515,
105 At!. 893 (1918).25 Hannecker v. Lepper, 205 S.D. 371, 107 N.W. 202 (1906).
26 1 Am. Jua- (SECOND) Adjoining Landowners §51 (1962).
27 Schultz v. Beyers, 53 N.J.L. 442, 22 Atl. 514 (1891).
28 Moore v. Anderson, 5 Boyce 479, 94 Atl. 771 (Del. 1915); People ex rel.
Barlow v. Canal Bd., 2 Thomp. & C. 275 (N.Y. 1873); Davis v. Summerfield,
131 N.C. 352, 42 S.E. 818 (1902); Beard v. Murphy, 37 Vt. 99, 86 A. Dec.
693 (1864) ; Knapp v. Siegley, 120 Wash. 478, 206 Pac. 13 (1922) ; Walker v.
Strosnider, 67 W.Va. 39, 67 S.E. 1087 (1910); Christensen v. Mann, 187 Wis.
567, 207 N.W. 499 (1925); Stockgrowers' Bank v. Gray, 24 Wyo. 18, 154
Pac. 593 (1916).
29Block v. Haseltine, 3 Ind. App. 491, 29 N.E. 937 (1891); Wenn v. Abeles,
35 Kan. 92, 10 Pac. 443 (1886); Flanagan Bros Mfg. Co. v. Levine, 142 M1o.
App. 242, 125 S.W. 1172 (1910) ; Tunstall v. Christian 80 Va. 9, 56 Am. Rep.
581 (1885).
so 169 Wis. 18, 171 N.W. 635 (1919).
31 Id. at 22, 171 N.W. at 637.
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The court later affirmed this doctrine in Christensen v. Mann 2 and
stated that a failure to give such notice, in the absence of actual knowl-
edge on the part of the neighbor, would be negligence.
There are jurisdictions wherein notice of intent to excavate is spe-
cifically required by municipal ordinance33 or by state statute.
3 4
Illustrating the extent of notice required is the case of Drott Tractor
Co. v. Kehrein35 wherein plaintiff sued for damages to a retaining wall
caused by the caving in of an adjacent trench Which defendant con-
tractor was digging for city water pipes. Here the court held that the
notice to adjoining land owners should give full knowledge of the in-
tended excavation in time to enable the adjoining -land owner to take
necessary measures to protect his property. 6
Non-Coterminous Tract Problem
Another demonstration of liability not based upon traditional com-
mon law rule arises where there is an intervening parcel of land. As put
by the court in Schmidt v. Chapman37 the question is:
Does the excavator have any different duty to the owners of
the property on which a building is located where in his excavat-
ing he trespasses onto an intervening strip (owned by a third
party) adjoining the property on which the building is situated ?
The excavator's vendor had retained a 5.75 foot strip between defend-
ant's land and that of plaintiff building owner; hence, the properties
were not adjoining. The resultant harm, said the court, was necessarily
due to negligence for which the excavator was held liable. This finding
is in agreement with Puckett v. Sullivan,3 wherein the court, presented
with a similar fact situation, held that the fact that plaintiff's land did
not have a common boundary with the area of excavation would not
deprive him of the right to recover for damage to his property caused
by negligence:
The right to lateral support is not defeated by the fact that there
are intervening parcels owned by other parties. The excavator is
an adjoining owner within the meaning of the rule, if his exca-
32 187 Wis. 567, 204 N.W. 499 (1925).
33 'ILWAUKEE, WIs., CODE OF ORDINANCES §18-4 (1951), provides: "When the
owner of any lot or plot of land or the city in making improvements is about
to excavate or cause an excavation to be made, which excavation in any way
affects any building or structure on an adjoining lot, a notice shall be given
to all owners of adjoining lots at least 10 days prior to commencing the
excavation. Such notice shall describe the intent and character of the excava-
tion work about to be done, and the adjoining owners shall thereafter be given
a reasonable opportunity to protect their property at their own expense in
compliance with the regulations of this code."
34 Sullivan v. Zeiner, 98 Cal. 346, 33 Pac. 209 (1893).
35 275 Wis. 320, 81 N.W. 2d 349 (1957).
36 Accord, S. H. Kress & Co. v. Reaves, 85 F. 2d 915 (4th Cir. 1936).
37 26 Wis. 2d 11, 131 N.W. 2d 689 (1964).
31 Id. at 21, 131 N.W. 2d at 694.
39 190 Cal. App. 2d 489, 12 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1961).
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vation results in a taking away of the lateral support of the com-
plainant's property. 40
The basis of liability in all cases where the injury has been caused to a
non-coterminous property has been negligence. According to the Re-
statement view,41 the risk of harm through negligence from the with-
drawal of support or the manner of the particular operation need only
be very slight in order that the excavator be found liable.
In such cases, it would appear that liability for injury is not based
upon theories of easement rights but rather solely on the law of negli-
gence. If regarded as an easement, the right to support here would have
to be an easement in gross rather than an easement appurtenant, be-
cause no part of the parcels involved actually shared a common bound-
ary. It appears that the court has here leaned toward the second theory
advanced by the Restatement42 by again requiring that negligence be
found as a basis of liability. Once negligence is present and actual harm
results, liability attaches to both the land and the alteration thereon.
This may be true even though the common law duty to supply so much
support has itself not been breached and the additional weight of the
building contributed to the damage.
Determination of Damages
When inadequate support is maintained by the excavator for land
in its natural state and as a result thereof both the land and building
of the neighbor are damaged, the courts have several views as to what
should be included in the amount of damages. The English courts and
a number of American courts, including Wisconsin's, 43 charge the ex-
cavator with both injuries to the land and consequential damages to the
building. Probably a majority of American courts44 hold the excavator
liable for injuries to the land only, and not to the building. The re-
maining courts have held that, absent negligence, damages are not re-
coverable for either the land or the building, since the building de-
stroyed the natural state and absolved the excavator from any liability.4 5
The courts also differ as to the measure of damages which should
be adopted for loss 'of, or interference with, lateral support. However,
since the peculiarities of the particular case govern, the real conflicts
are few, as the courts look at the reasonableness of applying a given
measure of damages. 46
The measure of damages approved in a number of lateral support
cases is the diminution of the "market value" or the "value" of the
40 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §605, at 219 (1961).
41 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §819, at 204 (1939).
42 Id. at 186.
43 Wahl v. Kelly, supra note 17.
44 4-A AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 116-17 (1954).
45 Ibid.46 Annot., 36 A.L.R. 2d 1241 (1954).
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plaintiff's land or premises by reason of the disturbance resulting from
withdrawal of the support. The Wisconsin court applied this measure
in Hickman v. Welleauer4 7 Some courts have held that whether this
measure will be extended to cover damages, if any, to structures or
other improvements will depend on whether negligence or some other
basis of liability has been shown.48
In the Hickman case, the court referred to the second measure of
damages, the cost of repair or restoration. This is frequently the proper
measure of damages in instances in which the injury sustained are
small and full repair or restoration can easily be made.49 Courts have
also considered this to be the proper measure where the amount in-
volved is less than the diminution in value and where there will be
compensation for the damage done.50
The Schmidt case 51 gives rise to an additional problem in the area
of determination of damages. In the retrial, the court will have to
make a division of damages based on comparative negligence of the
owner in failing to take available means to protect his property and the
contractor's negligence in supervision of the excavation. Clearly the
court here abandons the idea of strict liability for not supplying a given
quantum of support and permits the finder of fact to apply a test of
reasonableness.
Independent Contractor Liability
There are two aspects to this problem-the liability of the contractor
for his own acts and the liability of his employer for the contractor's
acts with respect to the removal of support.
An independent contractor has been held to be liable to the adjoining
landowner for damages caused to his land by loss of lateral support,
regardless of his manner of removal of the soil, where there is no issue
of negligence present.52 The contractor has been held liable for the
negligent and unskillful manner in which he conducted the excavation.
In Laycock v. Parker53 the court held that the contractor was liable for
injury due to his negligent acts not necessarily incident to the contract
or plan of work, and that he was liable directly to the injured party.
Negligence was the basis of the court's finding of liability on the
part of the contractor in the Schmidt case. 54 Here the landowner, Chap-
man, had given the surveys of the lot on which he wished to have con-
.17 169 Wis. 18, 171 N.W. 635 (1919).4s Mullan v. Hacker, 187 Md. 261, 49 A. 2d 640 (1946) ; Hamilton Building Co.
v. Rapid Transit Subway Constr. Co., 190 App. Div. 363, 180 N.Y.S. 70 (1920).
49 Stimmel v. Brown, 12 Del. 219, 30 AtI. 996 (1885).50 Meyer v. Rosendal, 84 Kan. 302, 113 Pac. 1043 (1911).
51 Schmidt v. Chapman, supra note 37.
52 1 Am. JUR. (SEcoND) Adjoining Landowners §45 (1962).
53103 Wis. 161, 79 N.W. 349 (1899).54Schmidt v. Chapman, supra note 37.
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structd an office building and parking lot to Hersh, the general con-
tractor. Hersh's supervisor did not measure the lot, but assumed the
lot went to a particular point on the Schmidts' boundary. Therefore,
the facts permitted an inference that Hersh was negligent in ascertain-
ing the precise limits of the Chapman property and hence, said the
court, was negligent in its supervision of the excavation.
The general rule appears to be that the employer is liable for dam-
ages to adjoining land in its natural state caused by excavation work
done by an independent contractor on the employer's land if the damage
resulted as the necessary consequence of the excavation itself 5 ' The
Wisconsin court in Wahl v. Kelly 6 held that the landowner had a per-
sonal obligation, which was a nondelegable duty, to preserve his neigh-
bor's support. He could not avoid liability by hiring an independent
contractor. But where it is the negligent method of excavation which
causes liability, rather than the simple removal of support, then only
the negligent excavator, if he is an independent contractor, may be liable.
Thus Schmidt does not change the rule that the owner is liable for re-
moving the quantum of support required by the common law. Here,
since Chapman had given Hersh, as principal contractor, complete con-
trol of the project, Chapman was relieved of liability for the negligence
itself and its results. This holding again tends away from a theory of
absolute duty of support and toward a theory which looks at the method
used in the actual excavation process. The landowner is able to relieve
himself of his duty where the contractor in fact controls the excavation
procedure.
Acts which will cause the employer-owner to still be liable irrespec-
tive of the manner in which the excavation proceeds include: (1) neg-
ligence of the employer in contracting with an incompetent contractor;
(2) interference with the contractor's work where the employer-owner
retains the right of supervisory control of working operations; (3)
furnishing of defective plans by the owner; and (4) failure of the
employer-owner to remedy a defect created by the contractor which he
might have discovered and remedied.57 Further, the employer is held
accountable where the injury caused by the contractor's negligence is
readily foreseeable from the nature of the work. 8
Practical Problems5 9
The law of lateral support tends to be a practical problem today,
specifically in those areas where buildings exist without basements or
55 Laycock v. Parker, supra note 12.
56194 Wis. 559, 217 N.W. 307 (1928).57 Annot., 33 A.L.R. 2d 111 (1954).
58 Ibid.
59 This aspect of the article is based on a conversation with a Milwaukee building
inspector.
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where pilings do not make lateral support less necessary from a prac-
tical point of view. In downtown metropolitan areas many of the build-
ings are constructed on "piles," which has the effect of removing to
some extent the problem of shifting and settling buildings caused by
neighboring excavations. Due to zoning laws, buildings in residential
areas are usually erected at such a distance from boundary or lot lines
that there tends to be little damage resulting from neighboring excava-
tions.
The solution of the owner of improved premises when he learns
of an intended excavation which may cause damage to his premises is
either to contract with his own contractor or to hire the contractor of
the excavator to protect his property at the same time he is excavating.
When the former method is chosen, the adjoining landowner has his
contractor work in conjunction with the contractor employed by the
excavator. However, the excavator is under no obligation to delay his
construction because the contractor of the landowner decided to take
time off and failed to return in time to protect his premises. The ex-
cavator owes no duty, after having given notice, to protect the land-
owner's structure.
60
Note also that if the excavator undertakes to underpin the neigh-
boring structure, he assumes the position of using reasonable and
proper methods of work with reasonable skill and care.6 1 It is the gen-
eral rule that where a contractual or statutory obligation exists, the
excavator cannot recover expenses which were incurred in protecting
adjoining premises, because in such cases he is a volunteer.62
The role of the building inspector in such situations seems uncom-
monly negligible in that he only sees that the rule of law with respect
to notice is followed. He does not have a part in the contract between
the adjoining landowner and the contractor hired to protect his prem-
ises, nor apparently does he evaluate the plans or supervise their ex-
cavation.
Conclusion
The policy of the law in the area of lateral support has been to favor
development of land by distinguishing between improved and unim-
proved property. This distinction, in theory, favors the excavating
owner by placing the burden of support on the owner of such improve-
ments. The notice requirements and, to some extent, the growing use
of negligence concepts are efforts to give some measure of protection
to the first to improve property.
However, the fine distinctions seem to break down and their ap-
plications seem to be arbitrary where the cost of support to one's build-
60 Schaefer v. Hoffman, 198 Wis. 233, 223 N.W. 847 (1929).
61 Hickman v. Welleauer, supra note 13.
62 1 AM. JuR. (SECOND) Adjoining Landowners §54, at 729 (1962).
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ing because of neighboring excavation may be prohibitive. Some more
equitable division of cost is desirable.
The law of negligence, which is involved intimately with the law of
lateral support, may have the effect of tempering the harsh rules. It
seems that courts are willing to find some negligence on the part of
the excavator in numerous instances. In so doing, as in Schmidt, the
court is at least providing for a sharing of costs after damage has
occurred on the basis of comparative negligence. Whether this type of
arrangement for cost division can be put into effect prior to the com-
mencement of excavation and damage remains to be seen. Only after
the court has reviewed numerous cases applying a test of ordinary care
would it be possible to say with much certainty precisely what the
rights and obligations now are under the lateral support law in Wis-
consin. COLLEEN A. ROACH
